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PROPOSED LEGISLATION: A (SECOND) MODEST 
PROPOSAL TO PROTECT VIRGINIA CONSUMERS 
AGAINST DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS 
Peter Nash Swisher * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within the past year, there have been an enormous number of 
recalls of defective and unreasonably dangerous toys manufac-
tured in China and sold by various American retailers.! Such re-
calls include lead paint found in Barbie Dolls, Big Bird, Elmo, 
Ernie, other Sesame Street toys, and Thomas and Friends wood-
en railroad toys, as well as toxic beads found in Aqua Dot play 
sets.2 To date, more than twenty-one million toys made in China 
have been recalled because they contained lead paint, tiny mag-
nets that could be swallowed, toxic glue, and other potentially 
dangerous contents.3 
Children or their parents who are injured by these unreasona-
bly dangerous consumer products, or any other defective prod-
ucts, currently have a strict liability remedy against the manu-
facturers and retailers of such defective consumer products in 
forty-eight states.4 However, Virginia consumers currently do not 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. J.D., 1973, University of 
California, Hastings College of Law; M.A., 1967, Stanford University; B.A., 1966, Amherst 
College. 
1. See Howard Pankratz, No Joy in Toys: Recalls Have Parents Worried, Kids Con-
fused, Officials Critical, DENVER POST, Nov. 9, 2007, at AL 
2. Id. 
3. Our Gift: A Guide to Finding Safe Toys, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 13, 2007, at 
A4. 
4. At least forty-five states have adopted a strict liability in tort action in American 
products liability law, thirty-nine of which follow all or part of the section 402A of the Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts. See Richard W. Bieman, Strict Products Liability: An Overview 
of State Law, 10 J. PROD. LIAB. lll, 111 & nn.1-2 (1987). Massachusetts and Maine have 
rejected a strict liability in tort remedy but, in the alternative, these states recognize a 
breach of implied remedy that cannot be disclaimed by the seller. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. 
19 
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have this almost universally recognized legal protection against 
defective or unreasonably dangerous consumer products.5 
The purpose of this article is to suggest a viable, necessary, and 
eminently reasonable legislative alternative that the Virginia 
General Assembly should enact for legitimate and pressing public 
policy reasons in order to properly protect Virginia consumers 
from defective and unreasonably dangerous consumer products. 
Adopting this alternative would bring the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia into the mainstream of twenty-first century American, and 
transnational,6 products liability law. 
II. PROTECTING VIRGINIA CONSUMERS VERSUS THE CURRENT 
"TORT REFORM" MOVEMENT 
Fifteen years ago, this author wrote an article arguing that 
Virginia should adopt a strict liability in tort remedy for products 
liability actions,7 as the overwhelming majority of other Ameri-
can states had done.8 
A Public Policy Arguments Supporting Strict Products Liability 
Remedies 
There are seven compelling public policy reasons for adopting a 
strict liability remedy in Virginia products liability actions. 
ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (Cum. Supp. 2007) (forbidding personal injury warranty disclai-
mers in consumer transactions); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A(2) (LexisNexis 1998 
& Cum. Supp. 2008) (same). 
5. See, e.g., Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 424 
n.4, 374 S.E.2d 55, 57 n.4 (1988) (''Virginia law has not adopted§ 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts and does not permit tort recovery on a strict-liability theory in products-
liability cases."); see also Harris v. T.I., Inc., 243 Va. 63, 71, 413 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (1992). 
The only other state besides Virginia that does not currently recognize a strict liability 
remedy in products liability actions is North Carolina. See Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 
268 S.E.2d 504, 509--10 (N.C. 1980). 
6. The European Economic Community has adopted similar strict liability products 
liability laws, largely based upon American strict liability principles enunciated in Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §§ 
1-21. 
7. Peter Nash Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform: Why Virginia Should Adopt 
the Henderson-Twerski Proposed Revision of Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
27 U. RICH. L. REV. 857 (1993). Professors Henderson and Twerski subsequently served as 
reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, and their proposed revi-
sion of section 402A ultimately resulted in Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabili-
ty§§ 1-21. 
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Compensation and loss spreading is the first public policy justi-
fication. The use of complex modern products inevitably results in 
losses, and because these losses can have a devastating effect on 
the individual consumer, it is humane and fair to shift these 
losses to all consumers of the product. This shifting can be ac-
complished by imposing strict liability on manufacturers and oth-
er product sellers that are statistically associated with the enter-
prise, forcing them to raise prices enough to pay for the losses or 
insure against them.9 
Deterrence is a second public policy justification for a strict lia-
bility remedy in products liability actions. This justification holds 
that manufacturers will make products safer if strict liability is 
imposed, and this rationale typically is grounded in economic 
analysis.IO Strict liability "increases product costs, but business 
competition induces manufacturers to minimize costs."11 Impos-
ing strict liability, therefore, provides manufacturers with an in-
centive to market safer products.12 
It also has been argued that strict liability will require manu-
facturers of products either to make them safer or to raise prices, 
and that either action would promote safety and safer products.13 
Raising prices would promote safety because higher prices would 
include losses resulting from product injuries (therefore reflecting 
true costs) and buyers, to save money, may seek substitute prod-
ucts, which would generally be safer.14 Moreover, the manufac-
turer often is in the best position to weigh a product's risks and 
utilities, and is therefore the "'cheapest cost avoider."'15 Contrary 
to the initial fears of some critics of strict liability remedies for 
American products, to date American businesses have suffered no 
8. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
9. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 975 (2000); Virginia E. Nolan & Ed-
mund Ursin, Enterprise Liability and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 
835, 844-45 (1996); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 
MISS. L.J. 825, 826 (1973). 
10. DOBBS, supra note 9, at 975. 
11. Swisher, supra note 7, at 861. 
12. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in 
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1071 (1972); DOBBS, supra note 9, at 975-76; Wade, supra note 
9, at 826. 
13. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
14. DOBBS, supra note 9, at 975. 
15. Id. (citing Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 12). 
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negative competitive disadvantage in the world market and the 
world economy.16 
Balancing the needs of consumers and manufacturers also jus-
tifies a strict liability remedy in Virginia products liability ac-
tions. Although compensation and deterrence are the most com-
monly cited bases for strict liability, no American court has ever 
required manufacturers to pay for all harm caused by their prod-
ucts or to be an "insurer" of their product's safety.17 To do so 
would place an unreasonable burden on manufacturers and other 
product sellers and discourage them from producing useful prod-
ucts. Therefore, balancing the needs of the product manufacturer 
against the needs of the consumer avoids over-deterrence.18 
A fifth public policy justification for strict liability in Virginia 
products liability actions is that manufacturers implicitly 
represent that their products are healthy, safe, and fit for their 
ordinary purpose, and consumers are entitled to rely on this im-
plied representation.19 
The sixth public policy justification for a strict products liabili-
ty law in Virginia concerns problems of proof. Quite often, a man-
ufacturer of a defective product is negligent. However, complexi-
ties of modern products technology often make it extremely 
difficult for the consumer to establish negligence. The consumer 
is at a disadvantage because the product manufacturer has 
greater access to expertise, information, and economic re-
sources.20 Imposing strict liability remedies based on the defec-
tive condition of the product, rather than trying to ascertain the 
16. For example, the World Economic Forum currently ranks the United States as 
first in competitive ranking out of 131 countries, including forty-eight other developed 
countries. World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008 (2008), 
http://gcr.weforum.org (follow ''Rankings" hyperlink). See also Barbara Kiviat, The Best 
Countries for Business, TIME, Nov. 26, 2007, at 59-60. 
17. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 12, at 1056. 
18. See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 
N.C. L. REV. 643, 658--59 (1978); David A. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of 
Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1629 (1981). 
19. See, e.g., MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY iJ 7.05 (3d ed. 
1994); William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1123 (1960). This justification would apply equally to breach of warran-
ty, tortious misrepresentation, and strict liability in tort actions. 
20. See Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. 
REV. 435, 465 (1979). 
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negligent conduct of the defendant, relieves the consumer of this 
very difficult burden of proving the manufacturer's fault.21 
Protection of consumer expectations is the final public policy 
justification for adopting a strict liability remedy in Virginia 
products liability law. Consumers should be protected from un-
known, hidden, or latent product dangers. This is particularly 
true because modern advertising and marketing techniques in-
duce American and Virginian consumers to rely on product manu-
facturers to provide them with safe, high-quality products.22 
These underlying public policy rationales for a strict liability 
remedy in American-and European-products liability law have 
been persuasive and compelling to the vast majority of American 
state legislators and jurists. It is surprising to this author that 
the Virginia General Assembly has not yet been persuaded by 
any or all of these seven compelling public policy reasons to adopt 
a strict liability remedy in Virginia products liability law. 
B. The Defense-Oriented "Tort Reform" Movement 
The movement to expand consumer rights in American prod-
ucts liability law over the past thirty years has not been em-
braced by all parties. Indeed, there has been strong and consis-
tent opposition by various business and insurance entities, 
resulting in a growing number of state and federal lobbyists and 
special interest groups on the defense side of tort litigation to 
"reform" American tort law in their favor.23 
Initially, these "tort reform" efforts consisted of ad hoc at-
tempts to address a series of perceived "crises," primarily in 
terms of the cost and availability of liability insurance.24 Howev-
21. See Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 
30, 34 (1973); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 458-60. Of course, the consumer must still 
prove that the product was in fact defective, that it was the actual and proximate cause of 
the injury, and that there was no comparative fault, assumption of risk, or unforeseeable 
product misuse on the part of the consumer. Likewise, problems of proof with warranty 
disclaimers or limitations are avoided with a strict liability remedy. Swisher, supra note 7, 
at 861--62. 
22. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: 
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 
1130--31 (1974). 
23. See JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL 
BACK THE COMMON LAW 5 (2004). 
24. However, placing a cap on medical malpractice tort claims in Virginia under Vir-
24 UNNERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:19 
er, in the 1980s, the movement began to develop a more perma-
nent and institutionalized approach to push for greater defense-
oriented "tort reform."25 Unsurprisingly, there has been consider-
able, and heated, debate about the goals of this so-called "tort 
reform" movement, the fairness of the specific "reforms" it seeks 
to implement, and the methods it utilizes.26 Indeed, one commen-
tator has viewed this "tort reform" debate in the products liability 
context as a conflict between two cultural views over the proper 
allocation of risk.27 
It is undoubtedly true that attempts by special interest groups 
to affect state and federal legislation will always be with us. As 
James Madison observed in Federalist Number 10, probably the 
most influential of all the Federalist Papers, special interest 
groups can counterbalance one another, and thereby avert tyran-
nical control.28 However, the current defense-oriented "tort 
reform" movement enjoys a substantial economic and political 
advantage over American consumers and their supporters: 
In the broader public debate ... tort reform critics are outfinanced 
and often outgunned. Their research typically appears in specialized 
academic publications and is only occasionally discussed in the popu-
lar media. Moreover, there is no prolitigation think tank to rival the 
ginia Code section 8.01-581.15 has not kept medical malpractice insurance premiums 
down, which was the intent of various "tort reform" proponents. See, e.g., AMERICANS FOR 
INSURANCE REFORM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: STABLE LOSSES/UNSTABLE 
RATES IN VIRGINIA (2003) 2-4, 6, available at http://www.insurance-reform.org/issues/ 
StableLosses03VA.pdf (stating that medical malpractice insurance premium rates in Vir-
ginia-as well as in Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, Ohio, and Mississippi-have not declined, 
but instead have continued to climb in spite of statutory medical malpractice damage 
caps). 
25. See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" 
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2006) (discussing the organization of the "tort reform" 
movement). 
26. Id. at 438. For support of this defense-oriented "tort reform" movement, see, e.g., 
PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE LOST ART OF DRAWING THE LINE: How FAIRNESS WENT Too FAR 
(2001); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
(1988); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA 
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991). 
For opposition to this defense-oriented "tort reform" movement, see, e.g., CARL T. BO-
GUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, 
AND THE COMMON LAW (2001); FEINMAN, supra note 23; THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. 
RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001). 
27. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE 158-62 (2003). 
28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 64-65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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likes of the Manhattan Institute's Center for Legal Policy, which 
supports the research of ["tort reform" proponents] .... 29 
25 
The impact of these superior economic and political resources 
and the "tort reform" movement's massive marketing campaigns 
have strengthened public misperceptions of tort law in ways that 
favor the defense, with a current widespread-but unsupported-
cultural belief of "too much litigation" involving "frivolous law-
suits."30 Indeed, much of the alleged "evidence" of a so-called tort-
related "lawsuit crisis" is based upon anecdotal evidence supplied 
by defense attorneys and others, rather than solid empirical evi-
dence.31 
Accordingly, American-and Virginian-tort law in general, 
and products liability law in particular, may be justified under a 
social justice public policy rationale.32 Under this rationale, "tort 
law arguably rectifies imbalances in political power, specifically 
with regard to special interest groups that may block or distort 
legislation, or capture regulatory agencies that originally were 
designed to protect the public good," and protects the citizens of 
the commonwealth.33 
It is clear, however, that the defense-oriented American "tort 
reform" movement will be with us for many years to come. As one 
commentator concludes: 
29. THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 45 (2002); see also BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE CAPTIVE 
PUBLIC: How MASS OPINION PROMOTES STATE POWER 174-80 (1986) (discussing the politi-
cal right's superior economic and political advantage in influencing public and legislative 
opinion). 
30. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact that It Has Had Is Between 
People's Ears''.· Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
453, 462-63, 476-93 (2000) (discussing the impact of the "tort reform" movements on 
plaintiffs' lawyers). 
31. See KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 26, at 6-8; Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in 
South Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury 
Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REV. 585, 591-92 (1988) (casting doubt on the assertion that there is a 
crisis in the tort system because empirical studies revealed no significant increase in the 
number of lawsuits filed or the size of verdicts). 
32. See PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., VIRGINIA PRACTICE SERIES: TORT AND PERSONAL 
INJURY LAW 6 (2007). 
33. Id.; see also John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 
560 (2003) ("By arming citizens with the power to sue corporations [and other defendants] 
for misconduct outside of the legislative and regulatory process, tort [law) corrects for this 
imbalance of power. In particular, it permits independent judges and especially juries to 
hold corporate America and other powerful actors accountable."). 
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In all likelihood, the movement's push for tort reform not only will 
continue but also will evolve to include more ways to achieve change 
favoring defendants. More specifically, the following are likely: (1) 
pushing for new doctrinal changes in favor of the defense side; (2) 
asserting new reasons why tort reform is needed; and (3) finding new 
forums to push for reform. Opposition to reform will also continue. 
This recurring theme of disagreement is not new; defining legal 
standards of wrongful conduct and liability always involves dispute. 
However, the nature of this struggle over tort law has shifted, and is 
likely to continue to shift, to a more politicized context where money 
and rhetoric tend to supplant traditional rational analysis.34 
C. Virginia Products Liability Law and a "Tort Reform" Response 
In 1997, a Joint Subcommittee of the Virginia General Assem-
bly (the "Joint Subcommittee") was organized pursuant to House 
Joint Resolution 523, sponsored by then-Delegate John Watkins 
(R-Chesterfield), to examine the "strengths and weaknesses" of 
Virginia products liability law, "and to compare Virginia's system 
with that of other states."35 This author spoke before the Joint 
Subcommittee on September 3, 1997, arguing that Virginia prod-
ucts liability law should be legislatively modified in favor of the 
consumer to bring it more in line with the vast majority of other 
states.36 This author believed that the subcommittee's initial 
charge to examine the strengths and weaknesses of Virginia 
products liability law, and compare Virginia's system with that of 
other states, was a positive first step in analyzing any proposed 
products liability tort reform recommendations, pro or con. 
Id. 
34. Hubbard, supra note 25, at 538 (citation omitted). 
[This] push is likely to continue for three reasons. First, the ideology of the 
movement provides a sense of intense moral commitment to get the United 
States on the right track and keep it there. Second, changing the tort system 
in favor of the defense side is in the self-interest of the movement's members 
because reducing payouts to claimants reduces their costs. Third, the profes-
sionals seeking these 'reforms' have a personal stake in continuing their em-
ployment. 
35. Deborah Elkins, Adopt New Rules on Products Law, Prof Says, VA. LAW. WKLY., 
Sept. 8, 1997, at A3. 
36. Id. ("'The Virginia consumer presently does not have the same legal rights that 
consumers in other states have,' Professor Peter N. Swisher told the subcommittee. 
Swisher, a law professor at the University of Richmond Law School, reviewed the current 
state of products liability law at the subcommittee's opening meeting in Richmond 
Sept[ ember] 3[, 1997]. Adopting portions of the Restatement (3rd) of Torts [Section 2], ap-
proved in May by the American Law Institute, would allow the Commonwealth to 'recog-
nize and equalize' the rights of products manufacturers and consumers, Swisher said."). 
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The Joint Subcommittee study was opposed by various defense-
oriented Virginia "tort reform" proponents seeking to quash the 
Joint Subcommittee's initial inquiry into the "strengths and 
weaknesses" of current Virginia products liability law, including 
any in-depth analysis of proposed legislative tort reform.37 In-
itially, a representative of the Virginia Manufacturers Associa-
tion (''VMA") tried to dissuade me from speaking before the Joint 
Subcommittee and suggested that future political and economic 
sanctions might be brought against anyone supporting this Joint 
Resolution. At the subcommittee hearing, Richmond defense law-
yer Gary J. Spahn, who has been defending products liability cas-
es for more than twenty years, stated that existing Virginia prod-
ucts liability law "'works reasonably well and is reasonably fair to 
manufacturers and consumers."'38 Spahn, who spoke on behalf of 
the VMA, said that he was unaware of "any studies showing that 
Virginia settlements or judgments [were] inadequate in products 
cases."39 "'Existing Virginia products liability law is perceived by 
manufacturers as being fair, and is a selling point not only for 
maintaining business, but also for attracting business [to Virgin-
ia],"' Spahn said.40 General counsel for the VMA, Carol Wampler, 
echoed Spahn's argument, saying that VMA members "cited the 
adage, 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it,' as their position on the reform 
of [Virginia] products liability law."41 Finally, "John B. Donohue, 
Jr., chief litigation [defense] counsel for Richmond-based Rey-
nolds Metals, also warned the subcommittee that 'the Virginia le-
gal system does not afford [defendants] the typical protection 
37. See id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. With all due respect to Mr. Spahn, this argument ignores the basic fact that 
most products bought and used by Virginia consumers are manufactured by out-of-state 
(and, increasingly, out-of-country) manufacturers, rather than Virginia manufacturers, 
and the legal rights of Virginia consumers should be protected against defective products 
manufactured by out-of-state defendants. Moreover, if Virginia manufacturers wish to sell 
their products outside the state, they must also comply with sister-state strict liability 
products liability laws. Does this mean that Virginia consumers should not have an ade-
quate remedy at law against Virginia manufacturers who manufacture, design, or market 
defective and unreasonably dangerous products? Why should Virginia consumers bear this 
unnecessary burden not shared by consumers in other states? 
41. Id. However, it can persuasively be argued that traditional American products 
liability law based on negligence principles is "broke" and does need "fixing." See supra 
Part II.A. 
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against frivolous legal claims"' that the federal court system 
does.42 
Significantly, however, none of these speakers addressed, nor 
attempted to rebut, any of the underlying public policy arguments 
supporting strict liability remedies in American products liability 
law,43 nor the fact that these strict liability remedies have been 
adopted in the overwhelming majority of other American states. 44 
Moreover, Virginia's ranking as one of the best states in which 
to do business arguably is based on a number of quality of life and 
other interrelated business factors,45 rather than based on Vir-
ginia's relatively weak and inadequate consumer protection laws. 
However, ten days later the Joint Subcommittee voted to disband 
itself. 
Although this author understands that this is all part of the 
give-and-take, rough-and-tumble legislative process that is an 
important part of the American and Virginian political process, 
the rights of Virginia consumers in a products liability context do 
need a more careful, in-depth legislative analysis-pro and con-
regarding Virginia products liability "tort reform." The decision 
should not be based on anecdotal evidence of various defense-
oriented "tort reform" proponents or, for that matter, on the tes-
timony of a Virginia law professor. 
If the Virginia General Assembly does not adequately address 
the legal rights of Virginia consumers and protect them from de-
fective and unreasonably dangerous consumer products in today's 
marketplace, who will? 
42. Elkins, supra note 35. But again, where is the empirical evidence of such "frivol-
ous legal claims?" See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
43. See supra Part II.A. 
44. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
45. Gregory J. Gilligan, State Wins High Business Ranking, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Jan. 23, 2008, at B9 ("Virginia stood out in this year's rankings [listed No. 4 among the 
best states to do business] because the state has maintained low jobless levels and has had 
a good pace of growth,' said Mike Kopko, the CEO index specialist for Chief Executive 
magazine. 'CEOs consider [Virginia] to be a nice place to live and hire people, evidenced by 
their A-rating for work-force quality and living environment,' Kopko said."). The top two 
ranked states for business, Texas and Nevada, have no state income tax. Id. Both Texas 
and Nevada, like the vast majority of American states, also have enacted strict liability 
remedies for defective consumer products. See supra note 4. 
2008] PROPOSED DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS REFORM 29 
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PROTECT VIRGINIA CONSUMERS 
AGAINST DEFECTIVE OR UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS PRODUCTS 
A. A Strict Liability in Tort Legislative Proposal 
In a prior law review article, this author argued that Virginia 
should legislatively adopt a "modified" strict liability in tort re-
medy, as proposed by Professor James Henderson of Cornell Uni-
versity Law School and Professor Aaron Twerski of Brooklyn Law 
School. 46 Professors Henderson and Twerski subsequently served 
as reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabil-
ity and their "modified" strict liability in tort remedy was incorpo-
rated into sections one and two of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability:47 
§ 1. Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused 
by Defective Products 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing 
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to lia-
bility for harm to persons or property caused by the defect. 
§ 2. Categories of Product Defect 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it 
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective 
because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product: 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs 
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised 
in the preparation and marketing of the product; 
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed 
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of 
a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission 
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; 
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings 
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of .distribution, and the omission of the instructions 
or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe. 48 
46. Swisher, supra note 7, at 865--66. 
4 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998). 
48. Id. 
30 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:19 
A more complete discussion and analysis of the underlying 
public policy justification and application of this proposed strict 
liability in tort remedy in Virginia products liability law is dis-
cussed in my earlier article,49 and will not be revisited at length 
here. 
The fact that a strict liability in tort analysis in Virginia prod-
ucts liability law did not receive favorable action by the Virginia 
General Assembly's Joint Subcommittee in 199750 suggests that a 
strict liability in tort legislative proposal today may share a simi-
lar fate, unless pro-consumer "tort reform" advocates and their 
supporters are able to resurrect another legislative proposal to 
study Virginia products liability "tort reform" in-depth. 
B. A Breach of Warranty Strict Liability in Contract Legislative 
Proposal 
A second modest proposal to protect Virginia consumers 
against defective products involves breach of warranty actions 
under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). Some states that 
have not recognized a strict liability in tort remedy within their 
particular state products liability law have instead adopted vari-
ous strict liability in contract remedies based upon breach of war-
ranty actions under the UCC-as enacted, for example, in states 
such as Massachusetts51 and Maine.52 
A breach of warranty action, which is a hybrid tort and con-
tract action,53 has long been recognized in Anglo-American tort 
law, beginning with common law warranties and the Uniform 
Sales Act,54 and culminating in the UCC,55 which has been 
adopted in all states, including Virginia.56 
49. See generally Swisher, supra note 7. 
50. See supra Part Il.C. 
51. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (LexisNexis 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2008). 
52. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 2-316(5) (1995 & Cum. Supp. 2007). 
53. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 636 (4th ed. 1971) 
("Whether it be tort or contract, a breach of warranty gives rise to strict liability, which 
does not depend on any knowledge of defects on the part of the seller, or any negligence."). 
54. See id. at 634-39. 
55. See U.C.C. §§ 2-101, 2-313 to -316, 2-719 (2007). 
56. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 8.2-101, -313 to -316, -719 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 
2008). 
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There are three underlying public policy rationales supporting 
breach of warranty strict liability actions for defective consumer 
products. First, "[t]he public interest in human life and safety 
demands the maximum possible protection that the law can 
give against dangerous defects in products which consumers 
must buy, and against which they are helpless to protect them-
selves . . . ."57 This justifies the imposition of full responsibility 
for the harm they cause upon all suppliers of such products.58 
Second, the product manufacturer or seller, by placing goods in 
the market, represents to the public that such products are suita-
ble and safe for use; by packaging, advertising, and otherwise, 
they do everything they can to induce that belief.59 When the de-
fective product causes injury to the consumer, the seller "should 
not be permitted to avoid the responsibility by saying that he has 
made no contract with the consumer."60 Third, it is currently 
possible to enforce strict liability breach of warranty actions "in 
which the retailer is first held liable on a warranty to his pur-
chaser, and indemnity on a warranty is then sought successively 
from other suppliers" and from the product manufacturer.61 
Unfortunately, breach of warranty actions under the UCC 
present serious drawbacks for the consumer-plaintiff in tort-
related actions. Warranties on the sale of goods under the UCC 
have two significant problems for plaintiffs who suffer personal 
injuries from defective products. 
First, the plaintiff-buyer must give notice to the defendant-
seller within a reasonable time after he or she knows, or should 
know, of the breach of warranty.62 When applied to personal inju-
ries, this notice requirement to a remote seller becomes a "booby 
trap" for the unwary consumer63 who "is seldom 'steeped in the 
business practice [between commercial buyers and sellers] which 
justifies this rule."'64 
57. PROSSER, supra note 53, at 651. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id.; see also Richard C. Ausness, Replacing Strict Liability with a Contract-Based 
Products Liability Regime, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 171, 195-98 (1998). 
62. See U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-607(3) (Rep!. Vol. 2001 & Cum. 
Supp. 2008). 
63. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
64. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 691 (5th ed. 
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The second serious drawback of the UCC is that of sanctioning 
disclaimers by the seller, which would defeat the warranty:65 
The other [troubling] provision of the [UCC in tort-related actions] is 
that of sanctioning disclaimers by the seller, which will defeat the 
warranty. This means that he is free to insert in his contract of sale 
an effective agreement that he does not warrant at all, or that he 
warrants only against certain consequences or defects, or that his 
liability shall be limited to particular remedies, such as replacement, 
repair, or return of the purchase price. Commercially this may not be 
at all an unreasonable thing, particularly where the [commercial] 
seller does not know the quality of what he is selling, and the [com-
mercial] buyer is really willing to take his chances. Commercial buy-
ers are usually quite able to protect themselves. It is another thing 
entirely to say that the consumer who buys at retail is to be bound by 
a disclaimer which he has never seen, and to which he would certain-
ly not have agreed if he had known of it, but which defeats a duty [of 
reasonable care] imposed by the law for his protection.66 
A number of commentators have persuasively argued, there-
fore, that any limitation or disclaimer of an implied warranty of 
merchantability or fitness that involves personal injury or wrong-
ful death should be judicially construed to be unconscionable and 
unenforceable based upon strong underlying public policy rea-
sons.67 Consequently, a substantial majority of American courts 
1984); see Ausness, supra note 61, at 200 ("The [UCC's] notice requirements appear to 
work well in commercial transactions between experienced and knowledgeable parties. 
However, the Code's notice requirements have sometimes proved to be 'booby traps for the 
unwary' when they have been enforced too strictly against ordinary consumers. The draf-
ters of the UCC tacitly acknowledged the existence of this problem when they declared 
that the purpose of [UCC] section 2-607 was to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive 
consumers who act in good faith of their remedies."); see also Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 
P.2d 455, 463 (Alaska 1983) (holding that "[a] consumer unfamiliar with commercial prac-
tices should not be barred from pursuing a meritorious claim because he was unaware of 
the need to notify a remote seller of breach [of warranty] before bringing suit"); Maybank 
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 273 S.E.2d 681, 685 (N.C. 1981) (holding that "[f]airness to the consum-
er dictates that he be given a reasonable time to learn of and to comply with this require-
ment"); Riley v. Ken Wilson Ford, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 717, 721 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). But see 
Branden v. Gerbie, 379 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (barring suit by an injured IUD us-
er against a manufacturer because of a fifteen-month delay in giving notice to the manu-
facturer). 
65. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-316 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 
2008). 
66. KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, at 691 (citations omitted); see also Ausness, supra 
note 61, at 202-06 (describing the disclaimers and warranty limitations authorized by the 
UCC). 
67. See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty 
Disclaimers, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 267 (1985) ("By now, implied warranty disclaimers 
can be readily attacked under [UCC] section 2-302's all-purpose ban on unconscionable 
contract clauses. Still, the courts applying section 2-302 to implied warranty disclaimers 
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are of the opinion that disclaimers of warranties that meet the 
requirement of UCC section 2-316 may, nevertheless, be found to 
be unconscionable in any action involving personal injury or 
wrongful death.68 
Virginia law currently holds that a warranty limitation to re-
pair or replacement of the product under Virginia Code section 
8.2-719 (UCC § 2-719) is unconscionable whenever personal inju-
ries or wrongful death result to the buyer-consumer.69 However, 
how the Supreme Court of Virginia would interpret a disclaimer 
of implied warranties under Virginia Code section 8.2-316 (UCC § 
2-316) involving personal injury or wrongful death is uncertain. 
On one hand, Virginia courts might interpret any disclaimer of 
implied warranties involving personal injuries or wrongful death 
to be unconscionable, as a majority of other American courts have 
done. 70 On the other hand, Virginia courts might uphold such 
have sometimes been tentative in their use of this regulatory tool. The general movement 
of products liability law, and the policy considerations underlying that movement, howev-
er, argue for a more aggressive judicial stance in this area."). See generally M.P. Elling-
haus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 814-15 (1969) (arguing the im-
portance of the admittedly vague unconscionability standard). 
68. See George W. Fahlgren, Unconscionability: Warranty Disclaimers and Conse-
quential Damage Limitations, 20 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 435, 471-72 (1976) ("Clearly, a majori-
ty of those courts that have considered the question are of the opinion that disclaimers of 
warranties that meet the requirement of [UCC] section 2-316 may, nevertheless, be found 
unconscionable. Indeed, in cases in which personal injury has occurred and has not been 
covered by an express warranty, the cases have nearly all been resolved in the plaintiffs 
favor. The buyer has rarely been successful, however when no personal injuries had been 
suffered and the parties were of equal bargaining power. Decisions concerning limitation 
or exclusion of consequential damages [under UCC section 2-719] have followed a similar 
pattern."); see Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 430 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Ark. 1968) (disclaimer of im-
plied warranty of merchantability was held to be unconscionable in a wrongful death 
case); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 97 (N.J. 1960) (invalidating a 
disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability because it was against public policy); 
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539-40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (disclaimer of im-
plied warranty of merchantability was held to be unconscionable and unenforceable when 
the buyer was injured due to a defect in the automobile throttle linkage); see also Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1964) (en bane); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber Inc., 110 N.W.2d, 449, 455-56 (Iowa 1961); Crown v. Cecil Hol-
land Ford, Inc. 207 So.2d 67, 68-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). But see Ford Motor Co. v. 
Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tenn. 1974) (disclaimer of implied warranty of merchanta-
bility was upheld, and not declared unconscionable, even though the plaintiff had suffered 
personal injuries). 
69. See, e.g., Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 402 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying 
Virginia law) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for injuries be-
cause Ford failed to rebut the presumption of unconscionability); see also Martin v. Am. 
Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 105 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that Virginia law prohibits the 
exclusion of consequential damages where such an exclusion is unconscionable). 
70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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disclaimers, even in cases involving personal injury or wrongful 
death.71 
To help alleviate this interpretive conundrum in Virginia, I 
would respectfully submit the following legislative proposal to 
further protect Virginia consumers against defective or unrea-
sonably dangerous consumer products. My proposed amendment 
to Virginia Code section 8.2-316 (2) and (3) appears in italics be-
low: 
Virginia Code§ 8.2-316. Exclusion or modification of warranties. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
rant of merchantability or any part of it, the language must mention 
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to 
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must 
be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied 
warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There 
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face 
hereof." 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warran-
ties are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults," or other 
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention 
to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no im-
plied warranty; and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined 
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has re-
fused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard 
to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have 
revealed to him; and 
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of 
dealing or course of performance or usage of trade. 
71. See, e.g., Moulton, 511 S.W.2d at 692-94 (upholding a properly drafted disclaimer 
of implied warranty). In an attempt to clarify this interpretive conundrum and to harmon-
ize products liability law in tort and warranty, a revised UCC section 2-319 has been pro-
posed, providing, in pertinent part, "[a]ny agreement, however expressed, that excludes or 
limits consequential damages for injury to the person is unenforceable." U.C.C. § 2-
319(c)(2) (Proposed Draft 1996), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ 
ucc2/ucc2sale.pdf. However, after extensive debate during July of 1996, the UCC Drafting 
Committee announced that it would withdraw Revised Section 2-319 in its entirety, in 
large part because most states (but not Virginia) already had enacted comprehensive strict 
liability in tort consumer remedies. Curtis R. Reitz, Manufacturers' Warranties of Con-
sumer Goods, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 384-85 (1997). Consequently, various "[p]roblems of 
disparate sales and warranty law in the field of products liability remain to be resolved." 
Id. at 385. 
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(d) However, any warranty agreement, however expressed, that ex-
cludes or limits consequential damages for injury or wrongful death 
to a person is unenforceable. 72 
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance 
with the provisions of this title on liquidation or limitation of damag-
es and on contractual modification of remedy (§§ 8.2-718 and 8.2-
719). 
35 
This statutory amendment and clarification to Virginia Code 
section 8.2-316 is a viable, necessary, and eminently reasonable 
legislative remedy that the Virginia General Assembly should 
enact for legitimate and pressing public policy reasons to protect 
Virginia consumers against defective or unreasonably dangerous 
products. 73 
In the alternative, if the Virginia General Assembly is unwil-
ling, or unable, to amend section 8.2-316 to provide that any war-
ranty agreement that excludes or limits consequential damages 
for injured consumer-buyers is unconscionable and unenforceable, 
then the Supreme Court of Virginia, interpreting section 8.2-316 
in conjunction with section 8.2-302, should judicially hold, as 
many other American courts have previously held,74 that any 
warranty disclaimer or limitation involving personal injuries or 
wrongful death would be unconscionable and unenforceable. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The overwhelming majority of American states, and most Eu-
ropean countries, currently recognize a strict liability legal reme-
dy to protect their citizens against defective or unreasonably dan-
gerous consumer products. However, Virginia consumers 
currently do not have these almost universally recognized legal 
protections against defective consumer products, based either on 
a strict liability in tort action or a breach of warranty action un-
der the DCC. 
72. This statutory language is similar to the language in the proposed revision of UCC 
§ 2-319(c)(2). See U.C.C. § 2-319(c) (Proposed Draft 1996). It is also consistent with similar 
U.C.C. § 2-316 legislation passed in other states. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11, § 2-
316(5) (Cum. Supp. 2007). MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A(4) (LexisNexis 1998 & Cum. 
Supp. 2008). 
73. See supra Part II.A for explanation of public policy reasons to adopt a strict liabili-
ty remedy in Virginia products liability actions. 
74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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This article recommends a viable, necessary, and eminently 
reasonable legislative amendment to Virginia Code section 8.2-
316 of Virginia's UCC, providing that any warranty agreement, 
however expressed, that excludes or limits consequential damag-
es for injury or wrongful death to a person would be unenforcea-
ble, and thereby finally bring the Commonwealth of Virginia into 
the mainstream of twenty-first century American-and transna-
tional-products liability law. 
Contrary to unsupported concerns of some critics of consumer-
based products liability tort reform in Virginia, 75 this legislative 
proposal would not be harmful to Virginia business interests, as 
demonstrated by the strong underlying business climate in Vir-
ginia and by other pro-business states that also have enacted 
strict liability remedies targeting defective or unreasonably dan-
gerous consumer products. 
Moreover, this proposal is a pro-consumer legislative one, not 
an anti-Virginia business legislative proposal, as some might ar-
gue. Indeed, most products manufactured and sold to Virginia 
consumers come from out-of-state, and increasingly out-of-
country, manufacturers. Virginia consumers should be entitled to 
the same legal rights and the same legal protections currently en-
joyed by American consumers in the overwhelming majority of 
other states. If the Virginia General Assembly will not speak for 
the Virginia consumer, who will? 
In the alternative, if the Virginia General Assembly is unwil-
ling or unable to amend Virginia Code section 8.2-316, then the 
Supreme Court of Virginia should judicially hold, as many other 
American courts have held, that any warranty disclaimer or limi-
tation involving personal injury or wrongful death would be un-
conscionable and unenforceable in the commonwealth. 
75. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
